

## Message Text

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 L-03 SS-15 INR-07 SSO-00  
INRE-00 EB-08 /048 W  
-----080065 221501Z /40  
O 221326Z SEP 77  
FM AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5949

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUXEMBOURG 0740

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, BGEN, LU, US, XT  
SUBJECT: WEST EUROPEAN FACTOR IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

REF. STATE 216662

1. COMPARED WITH ALMOST ALL OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, LUXEMBOURG IS AN OASIS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY. THE LIBERAL/SOCIALIST COALITION GOVERNMENT HEADED BY GASTON THORN WILL BE IN OFFICE FOR TWO MORE YEARS AND, AS OF NOW, APPEARS TO HAVE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF WINNING ANOTHER FIVE-YEAR TERM IN 1979.

2. IN COMPARISON WITH THE AMBIGUITIES IN PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES ELSEWHERE IN WESTERN EUROPE, LUXEMBOURG IS SOLIDLY PRO-AMERICAN. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION THINKS OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ALMOST 1944-45 TERMS, AS LUMEMBOURG'S LIBERATOR AND GUARANTOR OF POST-WAR SECURITY. THE SMALL NEO-STALINIST LUCEMBOURG COMMUNIST PARTY IS LARGELY WITHOUT AN AUDIENCE BEYOND ITS OWN MEMBERS. SOCIALISTS, ALWAYS MODERATE, HAVE NEVER BEEN IN ANY SENSE HOSTILE TO OR CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES BUT THEY ARE EVEN MORE POSITIVE IN THIS POST-VIETNAM POST-WATERGATE  
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ERA THAN THERE WERE BEFORE. THE CHRISTIAN-SOCIALIST OPPOSITION PARTY IS MADE UP OF MODERATE TO CONSERVATIVE CATHOLICS WHOSE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES ARE, IF ANYTHING, EVEN MORE FAVORABLE THAN THOSE OF THE LIBERALS AND SOCIALISTS.

3. GASTON THORN, THEREFORE, FACES FEW DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS

IN COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. THORN, A "PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL" IN THE EUROPEAN SENSE, DOMINATES THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE WITH HIS DYNAMISM, INTELLIGENCE AND CHARISMA. AS PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HE ENJOYS LITERALLY A FREE HAND IN SHAPING GOL FOREIGN POLICY. THORN NOT ONLY ENDORSES THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION BUT FEELS A DEEP PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SEVERAL OF THEM, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RECENT INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THERE ARE PRESENTLY NO SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN U. S. LUXEMBOURG RELATIONS.

4. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SECURITY, HOWEVER, LUXEMBOURG'S MOST VITAL INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE EEC. IN MOST TRADE, AGRICULTURAL AND MONETARY DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNITY, LUXEMBOURG TENDS TO SIDE WITH ITS EEC PARTNERS. ON UN ISSUES, HOWEVER, AND ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE U.S./EEC PRESIDENCY DIALOGUE, LUXEMBOURG IS ALMOST INVARIABLY WITH THOSE MEMBER STATES MOST FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS U. S. POSITIONS. NOT SURPRISINGLY, WITHIN THE COMMUNITY LUXEMBOURG SIDES WITH THE SMALLER STATES IN OPPOSING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE LARGER MEMBER STATES, AS FOR EXAMPLE AT THE RAMBOUILLET, PUERTO RICAN AND LONDON SUMMITS. ON OTHER EEC ISSUES, LUXEMBOURG IS LUKEWARD TOWARDS COMMUNITY ENLARGEMENT, STRONGLY FAVORS DIRECT ELECTION

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AND INCREASED POWER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, AND FAVORS MOST OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE TINDEMANS' REPORT. ON EURO-CUMMUNISM, THORN BELIEVES THE COMMUNITY MUST CONTINUE TO WORK WITH FRENCH AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS OF THE LEFT WHICH INCLUDE COMMUNISTS SHOULD THEY COME TO POWER, BUT HE IS PRIVATELY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE RESILIENCE OF EEC INSTITUTIONS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. AS A "GOOD EUROPEAN" THORN IS RESENTFUL OF WHAT HE SEES AS FRENCH AND BRITISH OPPOSITION TO STRENGTHENING THE EEC AND OFTEN LOOKS TO THE FRG TO DEFEND COMMUNITY INTERESTS, ALTHOUGH HE FEELS EMOTIONALLY AND CULTURALLY MORE ATTRACTED TO FRANCE THAN TO GERMANY. THORN BELIEVES THAT HE HAS EXCELLENT PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH BOTH SCHMIDT AND GISCARD AND THAT HE CAN AT TIMES HELP RESOLVE FRANCE-GERMAN DISPUTES. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND THE FACT THAT THERE IS LITTLE DIRECT LUXEMBOURG INTEREST IN MAY CONTENTIOUS ISSUES, COULD PERMIT HIM ON OCCASION TO PLAY AN INFORMAL LIAISON ROLE BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 L-03 SS-15 INR-07 SSO-00  
INRE-00 /040 W  
-----080336 221500Z /40

O 221326Z SEP 77  
FM AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
TO SECSTATE WAHHDC 5950

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LUXEMBOURG 0740

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6. IN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THORN'S INFLUENCE  
WITHIN THE EEC. THREE FACTORS SHOULD BE BORN IN MIND:

A. THORN'S POTENTIAL INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED.  
LUXEMBOURG IS AN HISTORIC ACCIDENT THAT SURVES IN THE  
20TH CENTURY BY STRICTLY LIMITING ITS ENERGIES AND SCANTY  
RESOURCES TO PROBLEMS WHICH TOUCH ITS VITAL INTERESTS.  
NEITHER THORN NOR HIS ABLE FOREIGN MINISTRY TEAM CAN BE  
EXPECTED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES  
OF CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.

B. WHILE LUXEMBOURG GENUINELY FAVORS CLOSE U.S.XEEC COOPERATION,  
LUXEMBOURG'S OVERRIDING FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENT IS TO  
STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN UNITY. THUS, UNLESS CONFRONTED WITH  
A DEVISIVE ISSUE OF SUCH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE THAT A CHOICE  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE IS UNAVOIDABLE, LUXEMBOURG  
WILL NORMALLY ATTACH GREATER IMPORTANCE TO WORKING OUT  
A COMMON EEC POSITION THAN TO COOPERATING BILATERALLY WITH  
THE UNITED STATES.

C. THORN IS PREPARED TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE TIME AND ENERGY  
TO U.S.EUROPEAN RELATIONS ONLY IF HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE  
UNITED STATES TAKES HIM SERIOUSLY.

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7. BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS, MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PURSUING OUR EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL OBJECTIVES WITH LUXEMBOURG  
AREAS FOLLOWS:

A: TOP LEVEL ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SHOULD GIVE THORN  
ENOUGH TIME AND ATTENTION TO CONVINCE HIM THAT HIS STATESMANSHIP  
AND INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES ARE IMPORTANT TO US,

B. WE SHOULD BE SELECTIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST THORN'S  
PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR U. S. POSITIONS. LUXEMBOURG'S SIZE  
AND INTERESTS PERMIT IT TO MAKE AT BEST A SYMBOLIC CON-  
TRIBUTION TO NATO DEFENSE, LUXEMBOURG HAS NO REPRESENTATION  
AND FEW SIGNIFICANT TIES WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES,  
AND LUXEMBOURG PLAYS NO DIRECT PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION  
OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THUS, DEFENSE, NORTH/  
SOUTH RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL ARE EXAMPLES IN WHICH  
LUXEMBOURG INFLUENCE IS LIMITED. FURTHERMORE, ON MOST OF THOSE  
ISSUES LUXEMBOURG SUPPORTS U. S. POSITIONS AND VOTES WITH US  
IN THE UN AND OTHER MULTINATIONAL FORA. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE,  
CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH LUXEMBOURG ROUTINELY AT APPROPRIATE  
LEVELS ON SUCH ISSUES, BUT RESERVE MAJOR EFFORTS WITH THORN  
TO U.S./EEC ISSUES AND A FEW OTHER GLOBAL INITIATIVES, SUCH  
AS SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHERE HE HAS DIRECT PERSONAL INTEREST  
OR WHERE HE CAN EXERCISE MAXIMUM LEVERAGE.

C. WE MUST RECOGNIZE AND RESPECT LUXEMBOURG'S PARAMOUNT  
INTEREST IN DEVELOPING COMMON EEC FOREIGN POLICIES. IF  
WE WANT THORN TO EXPLAIN OR ADVOCATE U. S. POLICIES WITHIN  
THE COMMUNITY, WE WILL NEED TO CONSULT WITH HIM FREQUENTLY,  
IN DEPTH AND WELL IN ADVANCE OF EEC MEETINGS--BEFORE  
MEMBER STATE POSITIONS HARDEN.

8 I DO NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THORN COULD OR WOULD  
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SERVE AS A SORT OF TROJAN HORSE FOR U. S. INTERESTS WITHIN  
THE COMMUNITY. HE OBVIOUSLY MUST BE CONVINCED OF THE  
APPROPRIATENESS OF U. S. VIEWS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES BEFORE  
HE WILL SUPPORT THEM IN THE EEC OR ELSEWHERE. NOR DO I  
MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS NEED  
TO DEVOTE AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF HAND-HOLDING TIME TO  
THORN. WHAT IS NECESSARY, I BELIEVE, IS THAT THE PRESIDENT  
AND THE SECRETARY SEE THORN ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF  
OCCASIONS--IN THE CONTEXT OF UNGA SESSIONS, OR ON THE FRINGES  
OF NATO AND OECD SUMMITS. IN SUM, I BELIEVE THAT LUXEMBOURG CAN BE  
USEFUL IN ADVANCING U. S. GOALS AND POLICIES IN EUROPE IF  
WE INDICATE TO THE PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WE  
TAKE HIM SERIOUSLY BUT AT THE SAME TIME USE HIM SELECTIVELY.  
LOWENSTEIN

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## Message Attributes

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**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009